We discuss sufficiently fast-growing sequences of Turing degrees. The key result is that, assuming sufficient determinacy, if is a formula with one free variable, and and are sufficiently fast-growing sequences of Turing degrees of length , then . In the second part (below), we define degrees for subsets of analogous to Turing degrees, and prove that under sufficient determinacy and CH, all sufficiently high degrees are also effectively indistinguishable.
A consequence of definable determinacy is that for every definable property, either it or its negation holds on a cone of Turing degrees. In other words, if is a sufficiently high Turing degree, then its definable properties are independent of . Moreover, if is a sufficiently high Turing degree and is sufficiently high above , then definable properties of are independent of . Here, "definable" depends on determinacy assumed; for projective determinacy "definable" is "definable in second order arithmetic". (Recall that projective determinacy asserts that every two-player perfect information game of length on integers (that is with moves being integers) and projective payoff set is determined, that is one of the players has a winning strategy.) We can ask whether the analogous property holds for infinite sufficiently fast-growing sequences of Turing degrees, and the answer turns out to be yes in a very strong way.
Theorem 1 (ZFC + determinacy for games on integers of length and ordinal definable payoff): Let be an ordinal and a real number. There is a function from countable sequences of Turing degrees to Turing degrees such that for all formulas with two free variables, for every sequence of Turing degrees of length with , the truth of in is independent of .
Proof: Determinacy in the theorem also implies determinacy for payoff ordinal definable from a real. Pick a formula and consider the game of length with the payoff set where is relativization of to and is the Turing degree of ( is a sequence of integers of length ). By determinacy, one of the players has a winning strategy. Because the payoff depends only on the Turing degrees (and with the help of a well-ordering of real numbers), there is a winning strategy that depends only on the last finite set of moves and the Turing degrees of the previous ω-sequences of moves. Pick such a strategy, and let be such that is the Turing degree for the strategy for moves up to where is the sequence of Turing degrees generated by the moves before . Since the other player can force the resulting sequence of Turing degrees to be any
with , the truth of in is independent of for all such . Finally, pick with , and satisfies the theorem.
Notes:
By varying , we can code-in an arbitrary ordinal as a parameter. Also, so that (and hence ) is in . The determinacy assumption in the theorem is consistent relative to a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals and (but that should be unnecessary) a measurable cardinal above them (see for example The determinacy of long games reference). A leisurely introduction to a similar determinacy hypothesis can be found in the "Determinacy Maximum" reference. "Ordinal definable payoff" can be replaced with another sufficiently robust notion of definability such as definability in third order arithmetic provided that is restricted to that class of definability. Also, if we allow any payoff ordinal definable from a countable sequence of ordinals, then we can allow in to be any countable sequence of ordinals. Weaker forms of determinacy translate into weaker forms of the theorem. For example, the theorem holds with replaced by a countable ordinal α and determinacy for games of length and OD(R) payoff. Projective determinacy suffices for the theorem restricted to the set of all expressible in second order arithmetic and finite sequences of Turing degrees (of the same length). For that set of , the minimum notion of sufficiently high that suffices for finite sequences is:
has a sufficiently high Turing degree above that of iff for every natural number , truth is computable from . The theorem holds even if Turing degrees are replaced by elementary time degrees:
is elementary time computable from iff there is such that can be computed from using time bounded by a stack of exponentials. However, using polynomial time degrees would not work since coding the opponent's strategy into the play is exponential (for games on {0,1} of length ); relativized P=NP toggles even for arbitrarily high polynomial time degrees.
Definition:
We say that holds for every sufficiently fast-growing sequence of Turing degrees (of a particular length ) if there is (from countable sequences of Turing degrees to Turing degrees) such that holds for all with ( is the order type of ).
For
, the notion of sufficiently fast-growing is not closed under subsequences. Every infinite sequence has an uncountable number of subsequences, so for example, for every , there are subsequences of that are not recursive in . However, the notion of 'sufficiently fast-growing' is well-behaved in that for every countable set of conditions (each represented by ), there is a sequence that satisfies all of them.
In general, a notion of sufficiently fast-growing sequences of Turing degrees is a function that maps each countable sequence of Turing degrees into a nonempty upwards-closed set of Turing degrees (which are the permissible degrees for the next element of the sequence).
Proposition 2: Given a notion of sufficiently fast-growing sequences of Turing degrees, there is a stricter notion such that (1) for successor , depends only on on the last element of provided that , and (2) (strong monotonicity) Proof: (a) Assume contrary, and let α be the least ordinal such that (under the canonical well-ordering of ), -th real is not in , and let denote that real. From the theorem, is independent from , which contradicts not being ordinal definable.
(b) Assume contrary, and let be a canonical well-ordering of (mapping ordinals to sets) such that sets of lower rank come before sets of higher rank and agrees with a canonical well-ordering of up to the least set not in . Let be the least ordinal such that is in but not in . Under the determinacy assumption, is inaccessible (and even measurable) in . Because for some definable function (specifically, the order of under the canonical well-ordering of ) from countable ordinals to countable ordinals, is independent of (to prove, apply the theorem to each and take upper bound for the rate of growth). must depend on , so there is the least ordinal (with ) such that the truth of depends on , which contradicts the theorem.
The theorem is surprising since the freedom to pick parameters would ordinarily allow coding in an arbitrary subset of . It is also surprising that even though is a sequence of disjoint countable sets of reals, the set of reals ordinal definable from is countable.
It seems reasonable that the least disagreement between and corresponds to a measurable cardinal in and an associated elementary embedding. For each s∈S, the least definable from S ordinal corresponding to appears to be the supremum of -recursive well-orderings, and a reasonable conjecture is that it is measurable in . Also, based on results in "Large Cardinals from Determinacy" chapter of the Handbook of Set Theory, it seems reasonable that each element of leads to a Woodin cardinal in .
An interesting project would be to work out the theory of definability from a sufficiently fast-growing sequence of Turing degrees . Here are some partial results.
Proposition 4:
(a) If is a sufficiently fast-growing sequence of Turing degrees, then . and , so to complete the proof it suffices to show that every set of reals in is in . Every set of reals in has the form for some formula φ (with two free variables) and some in . Using Theorem 1, we can show that the truth of is independent of (for all sufficiently fast-growing of the same limit length with and in ), so the set is the intersection of with a set of reals definable from , and hence is present in .
One consequence of the proposition is that (under the determinacy assumption), for limit that are not sufficiently closed (including ), in (or ), the continuum is a countable union of countable sets. For all limit , (and hence ) satisfies "there are no uncountable sequences of distinct reals". Also, as before, restricted forms of determinacy translate into restricted forms of the proposition.
We end with some conjectures. Conjectures: For finite length (with being a sufficiently fast-growing sequence of 
Degrees of Subsets of
For subsets of , we can define several notions of degrees:
Constructible reducibility: iff . Lightface projective reducibility: iff is definable in second order arithmetic augmented with a predicate for . Boldface projective reducibility is the same, except that it allows a real number as a parameter. Lightface recursive reducibility: iff is in in the following sense: There are formulas and with one free variable such that . Boldface recursive reducibility is the same, except that it allows a countable ordinal as a parameter.
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For each of these notions of reducibility, there is a corresponding degree notion generated by equivalence classes of subsets of . Boldface recursive reducibility is finer than constructible reducibility and boldface projective reducibility. Under CH, sets of reals can be coded as subsets of , but constructible reducibility (using in place of ) and both of projective reducibilities make sense for sets of reals directly.
Clearly, lightface recursive reducibility is the strictest notion, but it is sufficiently robust for our purposes. It turns out that under appropriate assumptions (specifically, CH and sufficient determinacy), all sufficiently high lightface recursive reducibility degrees are effectively indistinguishable.
Theorem 6 (ZFC + determinacy for games on integers of length and ordinal definable payoff + Continuum Hypothesis): Let be an ordinal and a real number. There is a degree for lightface recursive reducibility of subsets of such that for all formulas with two free variables and all , satisfies . Furthermore, for boldface recursive reducibility, can be chosen independent of . Proof: Consider a game on integers of length and payoff as computed in . If one player has a winning strategy, then by CH, it can be coded into a subset of . Let be the degree of one such code (under any reasonable coding). Because application of the code for a strategy to a partial play is recursive in the required sense, the other player can force the degree of the play to be any degree , so . Because every countable set of of degrees has an upper bound, we can pick a degree that works for all . For boldface recursive reducibility, every set of degrees has an upper bound, so we can a pick a degree that works for all and .
Notes:
Weaker forms of determinacy for games of length translate into weaker forms of the theorem (corresponding to restricted classes of φ). The Continuum Hypothesis is needed to be able to code the opponent's strategy into the play. We do not know what happens if CH fails. The theorem also applies to coarser degrees like constructible or projective reducibility. We do not know whether the conclusion of the theorem holds for sufficiently fast-growing pairs or sequences of degrees of subsets of . We also do not know what happens (alternatively, what consistently can happen) for degrees of subsets of larger ordinals. 
